EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF AGRICULTURAL BANK MANAGEMENT: THE IMPACT OF STATE REGULATORY POLICIES by Armah, Bernard Kaku Ndarku et al.
                             FS 98-08                                   June 1998
    Evaluating The Performance of Agricultural
                           Bank Management: The Impact of State
                                            Regulatory Policies
Bernard K.N. Armah, Jr., Timothy Park, and C.A. Knox Lovell
The authors are graduate student, associate professor in the Department of
Agricultural and Applied Economics, and professor in the Department of
Economics, University of Georgia.
___________________________________________________________
                            
                     Dept. Of Agricultural and Applied Economics
                 College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences
                                          University of Georgia       Evaluating The Performance of Agricultural Bank Management:
The Impact of State Regulatory Policies
           Bernard K.N. Armah, Jr., Timothy Park, and C.A. Knox Lovell
                   Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics
                                             University of Georgia
                                            Athens, Georgia 30602
                                           barmah@agecon.uga.edu
ABSTRACT---
We evaluate agricultural bank management performance, focusing on the impacts of interstate
banking laws on productivity change.  The generalized Malmquist productivity index decomposes
productivity change into technological change, technical efficiency change, and change in scale
economies.  While managerial productivity rose from 1982 to 1991, states that adopted the most
liberal interstate banking laws experienced the most improvement in productivity.  Large
agricultural banks were more efficient in states that had more liberalized interstate banking laws
while small agricultural banks fared better in states with more restrictive laws.
Key Words: generalized Malmquist index, interstate banking, productivity change.
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Evaluating The Performance of Agricultural Bank Management:
The Impact of State Regulatory Policies
Introduction
Prior to 1978, no state permitted out-of-state acquisitions of its banks.  Within twenty-five
years the interstate banking regulations that had been in place for over a century disappeared as
states adopted liberalized interstate banking laws.  The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 allows banks to branch across state borders after June 1997 if
states concur.  Deregulation which had proceeded as a state and regional initiative effectively
shifted to a uniform federal policy.  Policy analysts and state legislators continue to examine
whether these provisions benefit or hurt banks in their states. 
The main objective of this study is to evaluate changes in the productivity of agricultural
bank management linked to the banking deregulation using the generalized Malmquist index.  This
index enables us to investigate the contribution of scale economies to productivity change.  For
agricultural banks in states that had some form of interstate banking law prior to the Riegle-Neal
Act, we estimate productivity change focusing on the impacts of interstate banking laws on the
economies of scale and managerial productivity change.  We examine the impacts of relaxing
government restrictions on structural changes in agricultural banking by applying the generalized
Malmquist index which explicitly incorporate the influence of scale economies on productivity
change.
The survival of small local banks has been vital for the economic and social development
of rural areas.  Opponents of interstate banking assert that this policy could lead to the erection of
new entry barriers.  When large banking organizations acquire local banks and grow in market2
share, these institutions may apply newly acquired market power to carry out predatory pricing. 
This drives smaller competitors from the market and prevents the entry of new firms.  With the
concentration of local markets, banks with large market shares can increase fees on services,
increase loan rates, and reduce rates of deposits, denying the public the benefits of more intense
competition among suppliers of financial services.  Thus, removing restrictions on interstate
banking and branching might cause small banks to gradually disappear.
Supporters of interstate banking contend that removing interstate banking restrictions
would result in the entry of more efficient banks into local markets where previously sheltered
banks earn excess profits.  Proponents argue that a intensified level of competition will eliminate
inefficient banks and improve the quality and availability of financial services for consumers and
small businesses. 
The importance of the new regulatory regime is illustrated by examining the dramatic
reductions in the number of agricultural banks.  From 1980 to 1991, agricultural banks declined
from 5,316 to 3,952 as 350 agricultural banks failed and 950 either consolidated or merged.  The
remaining 64 banks were taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which allowed
solvent banks to take over control of the assets of the failed banks even across state lines.
Bank mergers have been justified by the existence of scale and scope economies.  By
contrast most studies of bank costs find increasing returns to scale only for small banks with less
than $100 million in total assets and decreasing returns to scale for larger banks. Measuring the
impacts of these changes on the performance of banks is critical given recent structural and
legislative developments.  Productivity measures that explicitly account for the impacts of scale
economies will enable legislators and banking analysts to identify whether productivity changes3
are mainly driven by technical efficiency changes, changes in technology or movement toward
operation at an optimal scale.
Regulatory Environment and Literature Review
We briefly describe the origins and development of banking regulation along with the
types of interstate banking laws that have been adopted by states.  Key studies examining the
impacts of interstate banking on the structure and the profitability of the commercial banking
industry and the effects of interstate banking on managerial skill are summarized.  The analysis
identifies key variables used in previous studies and the role of data aggregation in measuring the
interstate banking impacts.
The first federal legislation focusing on the geographic scope of bank operations was the
McFadden Act, passed in 1927 and amended in 1933, which permitted national banks the same
branching opportunities that states allowed their state-chartered banks.  Bank holding companies
(BHCs) are banks that own one or more other banks and offer bankers an organizational form to
circumvent intrastate branching restrictions.  The Douglas Amendment of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 prohibited BHCs from acquiring banks in other states unless those states
specifically allowed such acquisitions.  The McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment implied
the right of each state to determine a legally enforceable position on interstate banking expansion.
By 1991 different forms of interstate banking laws had been adopted in the United States. 
The approaches to interstate legislation generally fit one of three basic categories:  nationwide
open-entry, national reciprocity, or regional reciprocity.  Nationwide open-entry permitted
acquisitions and other activities by bank holding companies found anywhere in the nation.  This
was the most liberal form of interstate banking law and the majority of the states in this group4
were found in the West.  Reciprocity meant that out-of-state BHCs could make acquisitions in a
given state only if those out-of-state BHCs were in states that granted similar privileges to BHCs
in the other state.  States that adopted the national reciprocity law were not aligned in any distinct
geographic pattern across the United States.
Regional reciprocity meant that interstate banking was limited only to states specified in
the state legislation and reciprocity was required.  These compacts were usually limited to
adjacent states or those next to the adjacent states.  Most Southern states, including Alabama,
Arkansas, and Georgia adopted this law.  States that had not adopted any form of interstate
banking law consisted mostly of Midwestern states with a large scale of agricultural activity.
Lence (1997) summarizes key trends influencing the structure of the banking industry
since 1980, highlighting the role of economic forces driven by bank efficiency, market power, and
portfolio diversification along with government forces such as the relaxation of branching and
interstate banking restrictions.  Most of the studies listed were based on individual bank data. 
Our analysis is based on state level data to measure the impact of state characteristics as
key determinants of bank efficiency.  Panel data allow us to evaluate the impact of policy
initiatives and shifting state regulatory strategies across cross-sectional units over time.  States did
not uniformly and consistently adopt similar banking regulations.  By April 1, 1989 seven states,
including California, Colorado, and Pennsylvania had some form of regional interstate banking
law.  In March 1990, Pennsylvania adopted national reciprocity while California and Colorado
adopted the same law in January 1991.  By observing these units over different points in time,
panel data allow us to separate the effects of scale economies and technological change on
productivity.  The availability of extended panels of state level data permit us to focus on the5
sources of productivity changes identified in the generalized Malmquist index.
Other researchers have conducted studies concerning the impacts of the new intrastate
branching and interstate banking laws on commercial banks.  Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise
undertake simulations using commercial bank data aggregated nationally from 1979 to 1994
which suggest that nationwide banking will result in substantial consolidation of the banking
industry.  The study concludes that little change will occur in the distribution of industry assets
across organization size.  Chong investigates the impacts of interstate banking on commercial
banks’ risk and profitability using capital market data and the event study methodology.  The
evidence shows that interstate banking improves the profitability of commercial banks and is
associated with significant increases in the banks’ exposure to market risk.
Hubbard and Palia examine whether a more competitive environment requires greater
management skills in chief executive officers using interstate bank regulation as a measure of
competitive conditions.  Interstate regulations with fewer entry barriers lead to a higher level of
potential competition and demand managers with greater skills, resulting in higher compensation
levels for these managers.  This evidence indicates that a more competitive environment creates
the need for managers with greater managerial talent who can enhance the bank’s competitive
position. 
Swamy et al. investigate the determinants of U.S. commercial bank performance from
1980 to 1993 using state-level commercial bank data on rates of return on assets (ROA) and
equities (ROE).  Explanatory variables include bank-specific variables, location restriction
variables and a variable to measure general economic conditions.  Locational restrictions such as
barriers to entry significantly improve commercial bank profits.  Berger also utilized ROA and6
ROE in evaluating the banking industry. 
Studies determining the impacts of the banking and branching restrictions have typically
employed data aggregated at various levels such as industry, state, and national levels.  Wallace
uses state level data to analyze structural and efficiency changes in financial performance across
agricultural and nonagricultural banks from 1980 to 1991.  Although significant consolidation has
occurred, small agricultural banks have stayed competitive and outperformed nonagricultural
banks on several measures of profitability, liquidity, efficiency, and solvency.
McLaughlin utilizes aggregated bank holding company (BHC) data to examine the
impacts of interstate banking and branching reform on the BHCs.  Observed changes in bank
behavior following liberalization of state branching and interstate banking from 1988 to 1993
show that BHCs responded quickly to state branching liberalization by consolidating their banks
within states.  However, the BHCs were slower to respond to interstate banking reforms to
expand into additional states.
Mengle’s analysis is based on individual and aggregated bank data to show that interstate
branching is a logical and feasible step in the evolution of the geographical structure of American
banking.  The study outlines some arguments for interstate branching and then discusses ways of
application, the likelihood of adoption, and possible effects on the bank structure in the United
States.  Mengle concludes that both banks and consumers would benefit from such a law and
suggests that the number of large banks would decrease while small bank numbers would likely








Economides, Hubbard, and Palia develop a model of monopolistic competition between
large and small banks that highlights the link between performance measurement and interstate
banking restrictions.  We outline the main features of the model here, focusing on its testable
implications for assessing managerial performance in agricultural banks.  Assume there are M
banking markets with m participating banks in each market.  Competition between banks takes
place in a three-stage sequential model of differentiated products markets:  banks enter, choose
locations, and choose prices.
Small banks participate in only one market while large banks participate in g markets.  The
model determines the equilibrium price and number of banks and a profit function for each type of
bank.  The profits of bank I in market j are decreasing in the number of competitors in that
market.  Profits of small banks depend on one market only.  Profits per branch of large banks
participating in g markets are
where P is a vector of all prices for all markets in which the large bank participates. 
Depositors are informed about bank profitability by identifying banks that operate in
multiple markets.  Large banks have lower levels of profit variability than smaller banks by
diversifying their portfolios across multiple markets.  This risk-pooling argument applies even if
all markets represent identical distributions.  Drawing from economic activity across 8
the geographic markets that are negatively correlated is an additional factor that lowers the
variability of profits for large banks relative to small banks. 
To attract additional deposits, banks that operate in only one market respond by holding
more capital per dollar of assets than banks operating in many markets.  Small banks hold more
equity capital per branch than large banks.  Large banks have higher profits than small banks in
any market in which both types of banks participate.
Absent restrictions on interstate banking, the free-entry equilibrium is determined by the
zero profit condition for large banks.  Profits of large banks with no interstate banking restrictions
are $  and the free-entry equilibrium number of banks is given by $  = 0.  At this level of B                     B
l                      l
competition small banks have losses, $  < 0, depicted in figure 1 as the segment CD. B
s
Under the most severe entry restrictions no interstate banks enter and the zero-profit
condition of small banks determines the number of banks in each market.  The profit function for
small banks in figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium.  Small banks make zero profits and survive; 
large banks reap positive profits indicated by the segment AB.
The model yields a set of testable predictions for assessing banking performance.  In the
absence of banking restrictions the competitive position of small banks is eroded.  In markets
where small banks are dominant, Economides, Hubbard, and Palia suggest that interstate banking
regulation allows small banks to deter entry by large banks.  These results imply that assessments
of bank performance and productivity should be based on profitability measures plus
characteristics specific to the environment in which banks operate.9
Measuring Productivity Change Using the Generalized Malmquist Productivity Index
The technical efficiency of a production unit is a comparison between observed and
optimal values of its output and input.  This comparison can take the form of the ratio of observed
to maximum potential output obtainable from the given input.  Alternatively, we may define it as
the ratio of minimum potential to observed input required to produce the given output, or some
combination of the two.
In this section, we discuss the generalized Malmquist productivity index which we use to
measure and decompose bank management productivity change into technical efficiency change,
technological change, and change in scale economies.  The generalized Malmquist index,
proposed by Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, explicitly incorporates the influence of scale economies on
productivity change and accounts for three key components of efficiency changes over time.
First, firms adopt innovative technological and marketing techniques and induce the
frontier technology to shift outward over time.  The index T captures this component which
reflects changes in technology between the two periods or shifts in the production frontier
(innovation) so T is a measure of technological change.
The second component arises because banking firms undergo changes in technical
efficiency over time as they respond to competitive pressures and adjust marketing strategies. 
Index E accounts for this and reflects productivity change arising from changes in technical
efficiency between t and t + 1.  This index E measures a firm catching up to the best practice
frontier and represents technical efficiency change. 
Third, large banks may achieve economies of scale over time as they spread productive





























combine a bank and an insurance agency and sell loans, acquire deposits, and market insurance
policies in one organization.  The scale index S, measures this third component and attains a value
greater than unity if a change in the producer’s scale of production contributes positively to
productivity change.  A change in the scale of production positively affects productivity change if
it is a movement toward the technically optimal scale.  The index of change in scale economies
ensures that the generalized Malmquist index does not overstate productivity change when input
growth occurs in the presence of decreasing returns to scale.
An output-oriented generalized Malmquist index of productivity can be expressed as
where, the right-hand side elements in equation (2) are
The calculation and decomposition of the generalized Malmquist index requires the
calculation of output distance functions for each cross-sectional unit.  The efficiency score in
outputs for the kth firm at a point in time t, D  (x , y ), is obtained from the following linear o
t  t   t
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(4)
where the z  are intensity weights that allow convex combinations of data points.  Superscripts on k
the functions represent the technology defined by the data.  Subscript k' refers to a specific cross-
sectional observation and subscripts n and m refer to outputs and inputs.  D (x , y ) is solved
t+1 t+1   t+1
in a similar manner, substituting period t+1 data for t data.
The mixed distance function D(x , y ) is estimated by comparing observations in period
tt + 1   t+1
t+1 with the best-practice frontier of period t.  D (x, y) uses data from both periods to evaluate
t+1 t   t
(x, y) relative to technology constructed from t+1 data.  In estimating the distance functions for
t   t
the index of scale economy change, D (x , y) evaluates data comprising of period t+1 inputs and c
tt + 1   t
period t outputs using period t technology.  The subscript c shows that the distance function is
defined relative to some constant returns to scale technology.  D(x , y) performs the same
tt + 1   t
evaluation as D (x , y) but defines the distance function relative to a variable returns to scale c
tt + 1   t
technology. 
After solving these six linear programming problems for each set of observations, we
insert the values into equation (2) to obtain the generalized Malmquist index and its components. 
An index below unity shows a decline in productivity while a value exceeding one suggests
growth. 12
Data and Variables
This section discusses the data and measures of inputs and outputs used in the analysis. 
The estimates of the productivity indexes were based on annual statewide aggregate data for
agricultural banks for 1982 and 1991 using information on the agricultural and nonagricultural
banking performance from Wallace.  We focus on data that was available for 36 states for both
sample periods, building on the insights presented by Swamy et al. and Berger, Hanweck, and
Humphrey who also used state level data in their analyses of U.S. commercial banks.
Banks consolidate or merge to ensure an increase in present or future profits.  They
operate in markets and engage in activities that boost their current or future profits.  We measure
managerial performance using profitability measures consistent with Swamy et al. and Boyd and
Gertler.  Managers of financial institutions and other industry professionals evaluate bank
performance based on financial ratios derived from balance sheets and income statements. 
Profitability ratios measure the ability of the firm to produce net returns sufficient to sustain
survival and growth and serve as an indicator of bank management’s response to changing market
conditions.
The output variables chosen for this study are two ratios drawn from the profitability
measures -- the rate of return on assets (ROA) and the rate of return on equity (ROE).  The
return on assets is calculated as profits per dollar of assets and provides a gauge of how well a
bank's management uses its assets.  Together with the risk profile, ROA can be employed in
assessing a bank's ability to absorb losses before its capital position is threatened.
We select state level factors that potentially affect the loan base of agricultural banks as
inputs.  This set of state variables includes the average farm size, the number of farms, the average13
market value of agricultural products sold, the average value of Commodity Credit Corporation
loans received, the average value of land and buildings, and the average value of equipment and
machinery per farm.  These factors largely affect the borrowers' equity positions and their loan
repayment abilities.  Bank management attempts to harness these local attributes of the
agricultural sector in the efficient operation of their institutions.
Results and Discussion
In this section we examine productivity change and its components for agricultural bank
management under each interstate banking regime.  The effects of shifts in technical efficiency,
technological change, and the impact of scale economies on productivity change are presented to
assess how these effects are related to interstate banking regimes.  The analysis highlights the bias
caused by neglecting the role of scale economies in productivity change.
Table 1 summarizes the geometric means of managerial productivity change and its
components for the different banking regimes.  We calculate the index of productivity change and
evaluate the changes in its components for the individual states under each interstate banking
regime from tables 2 to 5. 
As indicated in column 5 of table 1, productivity rose by 39.3 percent from 1982 to 1991
with the primary source of productivity growth due to technological progress which increased by
28.3 percent, indicated in column 2 of table 1.  More significantly, the remaining managers were
more than able to keep up with the improvements in best practice as evidenced by the 6.7 percent
increase in managerial efficiency displayed in column 1 of table 1.  These results indicate that
agricultural bank managers adapted well to the more liberalized regulatory climate.  A positive14
relationship exists between size and productivity change and may explain the redistribution of
banks to higher size classes as managers capture economies of scale.
The expanded scale of potential entrants increased competition in the market for
agricultural lending.  We use term potential entrants because some states were due to permit bank
entry from more states outside their previously defined region.  For instance, Colorado was
scheduled to switch from regional reciprocal interstate banking to nationwide banking by July
1993.  Kansas and New Mexico, states that permitted no form of interstate banking, had
committed to adopt regional reciprocal and nationwide interstate banking laws respectively, by
July 1992.  Managers of larger banks more efficiently employed local resources in the operation of
their institutions.  For banks in states such as Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia that
recorded a scale index of 1 as found in column 4 of table 3, efficiency was mainly due to
diversification of outputs and inputs under constant returns to scale.  Here, small and large
agricultural banks could easily coexist since the size of the bank yielded no advantages.
For banks in states with nationwide open-entry, the fifth column of table 1 shows that
productivity rose by 69.5 percent with an average scale index of 1.229 (column 4, table 1).  This
suggests a positive relationship between size and productivity change as large banks were more
efficient under these competitive conditions than small banks.  This finding is consistent with the
results of Billingsley and Lamy that larger BHCs were expected to reap greater benefits from
nationwide interstate banking.  Technological improvements for banks under this regime were
slower than in any other group at 11.6 percent.  The measure of technical efficiency change
indicates that bank managers kept up with improving technology at a faster rate (23.5 percent)
than those in more restrictive banking regimes. 15
Productivity changes for states with national and regional reciprocity laws were lower. 
For agricultural banks in states with national reciprocity, the improvement was 36.1 percent while
that for agricultural banks in regional reciprocity states was 33.5 percent.  These results are both
displayed in column 5 of table 1.  Restrictions on entry by banks from other states may have
limited potential or actual competition.  As a result local banks may have gained an increase in
market power and did not have to operate at the most efficient level to increase their levels of
profit.  From column 4 of table 1 we observe that the average scale indices were 0.974 and 0.968,
respectively, indicating that more restrictive conditions seemed to favor small agricultural banks.
Featherstone and Moss (1994) estimate economies of scale and scope in agricultural
banking by disaggregating outputs used in agricultural lending.  Based on 1990 Call Reports from
7,108 rural or agricultural banks, they report an overall economies of scale measure of 0.986
indicating nearly constant returns to scale.  Economies of scale are exhausted at bank sizes
exceeding $60 million.  This result is consistent with the measures obtained here for banks
operating under the more restrictive banking regimes where scale economy measures of 0.974 and
0.968 were obtained.  Both findings suggest that restrictive interstate banking and branching laws
favor small agricultural banks.
These results reinforce implications from the Economides, Hubbard, and Palia model
which suggest that interstate banking restrictions enhance the competitive position of small banks. 
The empirical findings align with those presented in Swamy et al. who found that profits for
commercial banks were higher in states with substantial barriers to entry.  Under reciprocity
regimes, the main driving force of productivity change was technological change.  Berger,
Kashyap, and Scalise noted that technological and financial innovations, including improvements16
in information processing and telecommunications technologies, plus the dramatic increases in
automated teller machines over this period played an important role in transforming the banking
industry.  These developments confirm the significant role of technological change in productivity
growth.  The changes in productivity and the impact of the productivity components were similar
for both types of interstate banking reciprocity laws.  This suggests that there is little advantage in
restricting interstate banking to a smaller region rather than nationwide.
With no interstate banking entry, managerial productivity rose by 36.5 percent as indicated
in column 5 of table 1.  As demonstrated in columns 2 and 1 of table 1 respectively, technology
improved at a high rate of 14.8 percent while the rate of technical efficiency increase was lower at
a rate of 3.2 percent.  These figures may reflect bank responses to potential competition.  For
example in 1992, Kansas and New Mexico were due to adopt the regional and national reciprocity
laws respectively.
Column 3 of table 1 shows the indices of productivity change net of scale economies and
demonstrates the importance of using the generalized Malmquist index for evaluating productivity
change in agricultural banks.  A value for the scale index greater than unity indicates that a change
in the producer’s scale of production contributes positively to productivity change.  A positive
contribution to productivity results from expansion under increasing returns or contraction of
production in the region of decreasing returns to scale.
The figures in table 1 demonstrate that neglecting scale economies in measuring
productivity change in agricultural bank management causes the actual productivity growth to be
understated for states with nationwide open-entry where output growth occurred in the presence
of increasing returns to scale.  For states with some form of reciprocity law, productivity growth17
net of scale economies overstates actual growth in productivity since outputs expanded in the
region of decreasing returns to scale.  A change in the scale of production contributes to a decline
in productivity change if it is away from the direction of the technically optimal scale.  
Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the performance of agricultural bank
management from 1982 to 1991 facing different types of interstate banking laws.  A generalized
Malmquist productivity index highlights the contribution of scale economies to productivity
change.  We evaluated the effects of shifts in technical efficiency, technological change, and the
impact of scale economies on productivity change in agricultural banks.  The magnitudes of these
impacts are related to different types of interstate banking regimes.
Results showed that managerial productivity change, measured by the generalized
Malmquist index, did increase over the period by 39.3 percent.  States that had adopted or were
about to adopt the most liberal interstate banking laws experienced the most improvement in
productivity.
We observed an overall positive relationship between agricultural bank size and
productivity.  Large agricultural banks were more efficient in states that had a more liberalized
interstate banking law while small agricultural banks fared better in states with more restrictive
laws.  Neglecting the impacts of scale economies on productivity change causes us to understate
actual productivity growth and the efficacy of the generalized Malmquist index in eliminating this
bias is confirmed in evaluating productivity growth in states with nationwide open-entry.  
We conclude that interstate banking reforms enhance managerial productivity of
agricultural banks and allows managers to take advantage of economies of scale.  Thus, the18
Riegle-Neal provision for national interstate banking will eventually be profitable for states. 
However, managers have to adopt more efficient practices in the operation of small banks.  High
costs of adjustment limit the ability of small banks to expand.  For small agricultural banks to
survive in the more liberalized markets, managers can operate more efficiently by making use of
their specialized knowledge of local client information.  19
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Table 1.  Geometric Means of Productivity Change for the Different Regimes
Regimes Technical Technological Productivity Scale Index Generalized
Efficiency Change Index Change Net Malmquist
Change of  Scale Index
Index Effects
All Regimes 1.067 1.283 1.369 1.017 1.393
Group 1 1.235 1.116 1.379 1.229 1.695
Group 2 1.077 1.297 1.398 0.974 1.361
Group 3 1.011 1.365 1.379 0.968 1.335
Group 4 1.032 1.148 1.119 1.151 1.365
Group 1.  Banks in States with Nationwide Open Entry
Group 2.  Banks in States with Nationwide Reciprocal Entry 
Group 3.  Banks in States with Regional Reciprocal Entry 
Group 4.  Banks in States with No Interstate Banking Laws 22
Table 2.  Indices of Productivity Change for Banks in States with Nationwide Open Entry (Group
1)
States Technical Technological Productivity Scale Index Generalized
Efficiency Change Index Change Net Malmquist
Change Index of Scale Index
Effects
Idaho 1.611 0.978 1.576 1.400 2.205
Oklahoma 1.184 1.476 1.748 1.184 2.069
Texas 0.924 1.108 1.024 1.023 1.047
Utah 1.560 1.198 1.869 1.583 2.957
Wyoming 1.047 0.978 1.024 1.047 1.071
Geometric 1.235 1.116 1.379 1.229 1.695
Mean23
Table 3.  Indices of Productivity Change for Banks in States with National Reciprocal Entry
(Group 2)
States Technical Technological Productivity Scale Index Generalized
Efficiency Change Index Change Net Malmquist
Change Index of Scale Index
Effects
California 1.176 1.336 1.571 0.978 1.537
Illinois 0.944 1.483 1.400 0.827 1.157
Kentucky 1.000 1.433 1.433 1.000 1.433
Louisiana 0.963 1.321 1.272 0.985 1.253
Michigan 1.201 1.328 1.595 0.935 1.491
Nebraska 1.103 1.445 1.594 1.061 1.691
New York 0.962 1.446 1.391 0.970 1.348
North Dakota 1.307 1.287 1.682 1.096 1.843
Ohio 1.218 1.511 1.840 0.898 1.652
Pennsylvania 1.000 1.462 1.462 1.000 1.462
South Dakota 1.483 1.366 20.026 1.099 2.225
Vermont 0.733 0.577 0.423 0.733 0.310
Washington 1.204 1.096 203 1.132 1.494
West Virginia 1.000 1.502 1.502 1.000 1.502
Geometric 1.077 1.297 1.398 0.974 1.361
Mean24
Table 4.  Indices of Productivity Change for banks in States with Regional Reciprocal Entry
(Group 3)
States Technical Technological Productivity Scale Index Generalized
Efficiency Change Index Change Net Malmquist
Change Index of Scale Index
Effects
Alabama 0.701 1.425 0.999 0.954 0.953
Arkansas 1.267 1.329 1.685 0.946 1.594
Colorado 1.038 1.060 1.100 1.060 1.166
Florida 0.647 1.541 0.997 0.792 0.789
Georgia 0.974 1.369 1.333 1.008 1.345
Indiana 1.378 1.490 2.033 0.874 1.795
Iowa 0.960 1.464 1.405 0.883 1.241
Maryland 1.069 1.509 1.613 1.069 1.724
Minnesota 0.970 1.324 1.284 0.938 1.204
Mississippi 1.211 1.214 1.470 1.061 1.559
Missouri 1.175 1.146 1.347 1.058 1.424
Tennessee 0.938 1.428 1.340 0.938 1.257
Virginia 1.131 1.478 1.672 0.999 1.669
Wisconsin 0.964 1.436 1.384 1.017 1.409
Geometric 1.011 1.365 1.379 0.968 1.335
Mean25
Table 5.  Indices of Productivity Change for Banks in States with No Interstate Banking
(Group 4)
States Technical Technological Productivity Scale Index Generalized
Efficiency Change Index Change Net Malmquist
Change Index of Scale Index
Effects
Kansas 1.382 1.345 1.859 1.298 2.413
Montana 1.140 1.108 1.263 1.136 1.434
New Mexico 0.699 1.015 0.710 1.034 0.734
Geometric 1.032 1.148 1.119 1.151 1.365
Mean26